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This paper studies an occupational choice in which risk-neutral private agents have 
the option of either working in costless but low-yielding activity or undertaking a costly but 
potentially more rewarding venture, namely, entrepreneurship. Loans must be acquired from 
financial intermediaries and licences must be obtained from public officials for 
entrepreneurship. This paper has integrated two new ingredients into the traditional 
occupational choice framework: financial market imperfection due to asymmetric 
information between entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries; public-sector imperfection 
due to rent-seeking induced uncertainty on bribe demand. The paper shows how corruption 
has different effects depending on how it is practised. Under disorganised corruption, bribe 
payments are uncertain, and capital market imperfections surface; under organised corruption, 
these features are removed. This implies that organised corruption is likely to be the lesser of 
the two evils in terms of deterring entrepreneurial activity, even if bribe demands are higher 
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• A model of occupational choice: risk-neutral private individuals have an option of 
either working in subsistence production or undertaking entrepreneurship. 
 
• For entrepreneurship, loans must be acquired from financial intermediaries and 
licences must be obtained from public officials. 
 
• Two potential sources of imperfection: the financial market due to asymmetric 
information, and governance due to rent-seeking. 
 
• Organised bureaucratic corruption allows more individuals to become entrepreneurs 
than does disorganised bureaucratic corruption, even if bribe demand is higher in this 
case.  
 




















Corruption defined as the abuse of power by public officials for personal gain (e.g., 
Aidt, 2003; Jain, 2001; Treisman, 2000) is widely acknowledged as one of the most 
threatening, resilient and pervasive obstacles to economic growth and social development.1 
The most deprived countries of the world are often the most corrupt for long periods. This is 
seen as being more than just a coincidence, and it evokes alarm that such countries have 
become trapped in a vicious circle of widespread poverty and wholesale misgovernance. A 
considerable amount of evidence exists to support the above concerns, with numerous 
empirical studies identifying significant adverse effects of corruption on growth (e.g., Ades 
and Di Tella, 1997; Johnson et al., 2011; Mauro, 1995; Mo, 2001; Swaleheen, 2011), and 
numerous others indicating the reverse causality from growth to corruption (e.g., Holcombe 
and Boudreaux, 2015; Treisman, 2000). There is also a fair amount of theoretical work which 
seeks to explain this evidence, together with addressing various other issues relating to the 
macroeconomics of misgovernance (e.g., Acemoglu and Verdier, 1998 and 2000; Blackburn 
et al., 2006; Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio, 2009; Dzhumashev, 2014 and 2016; Ehrlich and 
Lui, 1999). Given all the above, it is not surprising that bureaucratic corruption has become a 
principal or foremost topic of debate on the international development agenda. 
Despite the above, there are reasons to be cautious about the strong condemnation of 
corruption as being a significant impediment to growth. The damaging effects of corruption 
on economic performance differ significantly across countries. Many countries, including, for 
example, South Asian countries and many African countries, have undoubtedly suffered 
considerably, while others appear to have coped well with the problem. The most striking 
examples form the basis of what Wedeman (2002) has termed the “East Asian paradox”. This 
paradox relates to countries such as China, Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand, all of which 
have displayed exceptional growth records despite their notoriety as having thriving 
corruption cultures. Such observations suggest that the relationship between corruption and 
growth can be reasonably tenuous in some cases, and it would appear that there is slightly 
more to this relationship than at first meets the eye.  
 
1 I use this definition as the paper focuses on public sector corruption. In particular, I intend to model the 
malfeasance of bureaucrats, which is the petty corruption (or bureaucratic corruption) but not grand corruption 
(or political corruption). If no bureaucrat distributes rents in the first place, there will be no corruption. However, 
it is important to clarify that corruption is also rampant in the private sector as discussed by many others (e.g., 
Bardhan, 2006; Hogdson and Jiang, 2007; Murphy et al., 1993). Entrepreneurs may initiate illicit activities, such 
as lobbying or bribing bureaucrats which induces unproductive entrepreneurship hurting firm productivity (e.g., 
Baumol, 1996; Collins et al., 2016).  
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Some existing literature suggests that corruption might be growth-enhancing by 
helping to circumvent cumbersome regulations and institutional hurdles in the bureaucratic 
process (e.g., Huntington, 1968). Corruption may improve the quality of civil service (e.g., 
Leys, 1970) and may allocate licences and permits to the most efficient firm which can pay 
the highest bribe (e.g., Beck and Mahler, 1986; Leff, 1964) – which is merely an application 
of the second-best theory, whereby in the presence of pre-existing distortions such as red tape, 
additional distortions such as bribe payments may serve to improve efficiency. This implies 
that the impact of corruption on growth is context-specific, depending on the particular 
circumstances. For example, Neeman et al. (2008) find that corruption and income are 
negatively correlated in open economies but show no relationship in closed economies. Ahlin 
and Pang (2008) argue that financial development matters to the relationship between 
corruption and growth. There exists a substitution effect between corruption control and 
financial development. Celimene et al. (2016) suggest that if illegal incomes from corruption 
are invested in equity markets, the usual externalities of corruption can be internalised and 
hence compensate for the negative impact on economic growth. More studies point towards 
the quality of institutions as an essential determining factor. Aidt et al. (2008) find that 
corruption has a significant negative effect on growth under high-quality political institutions, 
whereas the effect is muted under low-quality political institutions. In the same vein, Meon 
and Weill (2010) observe that corruption is less harmful to growth if institutions are weak. 
Dreher and Gassebner (2013) provide some empirical evidence to support the argument that 
corruption facilitates firms’ entry into highly regulated economies.  
A more promising explanation for the puzzling phenomenon of the corruption–growth 
nexus is the industrial organisation theory of bureaucratic corruption. The seminal 
contributions in this area are credited to Andvig and Moene (1990), and Shleifer and Vishny 
(1993). In order to conduct business, individuals must acquire various types of governmental 
goods (e.g., licences, permits and certificates). These governmental goods are complements 
to each other and are provided by different government agencies. Under such circumstances, 
the extent to which public officials are organised in their extraction of bribes can have an 
important influence on the consequences of rent-seeking. In the case of disorganised (or non-
coordinated) rent-seeking, each bureaucrat acts as an independent monopolist, supplying his 
own governmental good in exchange for a bribe which he chooses so as to maximise his own 
illegal income without taking into account the negative externality imposed on the demand 
for other governmental goods and the bribe-taking capacity of other bureaucrats. By contrast, 
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in the case of organised (or coordinated) rent-seeking, bureaucrats act together as a joint 
monopoly, choosing bribe payments that maximise their total illegal income while 
internalising any externalities. The implication is that the level of bribes will be lower, the 
provision of governmental goods will be greater, and the scale of distortions will be smaller 
when corruption is organised than when it is disorganised.2 This paper is in alignment with 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993). Disorganised corruption is defined as bureaucrats acting 
individualistically in demanding illegal payments from private agents in exchange for 
governmental goods, whereas organised corruption is defined as bureaucrats acting 
collectively in the same misbehaviour. The distinction between organised and disorganised 
corruption relates to the extent to which public officials coordinate their illegal activities 
amongst themselves which is closely associated with centralised or decentralised public-
sector organisation. In the case of disorganised corruption, each public official acts 
individualistically, choosing his own illegal profiteering to maximise his own unlawful 
income without taking into account the potential effect of this on the unlawful earning 
capacities of others. In the case of organised corruption, public officials act together as a joint 
monopolist, choosing their illegal gains jointly to maximise their collective illegal income in 
a way that internalises any externalities. 
Another aspect of the industrial organisation theory merits equal credit and is 
increasingly attracting attention. It is often claimed that an inevitable consequence of 
corruption is the creation of uncertainty. Perpetrators of corrupt practices have good cause to 
conceal their intentions and shroud their behaviour in secrecy. The same bureaucrats may 
themselves be unsure of the likelihood of being monitored and apprehended. Illicit deals and 
agreements are inherently risky because they lack the enforceability of legally binding 
contracts. Free entry into the rent-seeking sector can make bribe demands erratic and 
unpredictable. Hence, corruption is seen as introducing arbitrariness and randomness into the 
costs of doing business. Such considerations have been the focus of several empirical studies 
which suggest that corruption-induced uncertainty has significant positive effects on 
 
2 It is possible to obtain the opposite result if governmental goods are substitutes for each other, or if the same 
governmental good is provided by more than one bureaucrat (e.g., Drugov, 2010). In this case competition 
between bureaucrats without collusion could drive down the level of bribes relative to the monopoly outcome in 
the presence of collusion. However, as noted by others (e.g., Bliss and Di Tella, 1997; Bose, 2004), the 
conditions for ensuring a competitive equilibrium, such as zero search costs for individuals in their acquisition 
of information about bribe payments, and zero capacity constraints on bureaucrats in their supply of 
governmental goods, are fairly stringent and not obviously satisfied in practice. Drugov (2010) also shows that 
competition may not be good for detecting corrupt bureaucrats, whereas monopoly achieves a better ex post 
licence allocation, particularly for goods with high costs. 
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bargaining frictions in the bribe negotiating process (e.g., Fisman and Gatti, 2006), and 
significant adverse effects on rates of investment, including foreign direct investment (e.g., 
Campos et al., 1999) and total bribe payments (e.g., Olken and Barron, 2009). Diaby and 
Sylwester (2014) find some empirical evidence that bribe payment is likely to be lower when 
corruption-induced uncertainty is lower. An implication of these findings is that institutional 
structures under which corruption is more predictable are likely to be less harmful to 
efficiency and growth. One may imagine that more organised bureaucracies eliminate or 
alleviate the need for individuals to engage in a myriad of separate bilateral negotiations with 
different public officials. Thus, an individual’s total bribe payment may be more transparent 
and predictable when it is decided and received by a single consortium of bureaucrats 
pursuing a common objective than when it is the sum of independent payments made to a 
number of bureaucrats acting on their own. In the case of the former, the size of the bribe 
payment may be well-known in advance, and only one such payment may be needed in order 
to acquire all licences. In the case of the latter, the amount and frequency of kickbacks may 
be much less clear and there may be no guarantee that other licences will be obtained from 
the rest of the bureaucrats. These analyses point to a strong presumption that the more 
organised corruption is, the less uncertainty it generates and the less damage it inflicts.  
The factors I have alluded to above are particularly relevant in the context of the East 
Asian paradox countries as discussed by many others (e.g., Khan, 1998; Rock, 2009; Vial and 
Hanoteau, 2010; Wang, 2019; Wedeman, 2012). China, Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand 
experience high-corruption and high-growth economies in which organised corrupt activities 
have thrived. At the same time, in South Asia and Africa, countries are commonly observed 
with high-corruption and low-growth in which disorganised corrupt behaviour has flourished. 
Why different corruption regimes exist is an interesting question that may well find an 
answer in the particular cultures, ideologies and institutions of countries. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1993) state that more ethnically diverse countries are likely to form disorganised corruption, 
which is consistent with the empirical finding in Mauro (1995). Wang (2019) argues that 
Confucian ethical philosophy is likely to breed organised corruption networks in East Asia, 
evidenced by similar corruption-growth puzzles observed in relation to most East Asian 
countries’ economic development path. One prominent example is China. Lu (2000) and 
Gong (2002) describe it as an environment in which corruption takes place through well-
organised networks of rent-seeking public officials. Within the bureaucracy, it is normal 
practice for subordinate officials to share their illegal income with superiors in return for 
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obtaining tacit approval to engage in rent-seeking. Working together, bureaucrats establish an 
agreed and predictable pattern of rent extraction. Another important factor that is more 
distinctly Chinese is the traditional affiliation of work units. Work units are still powerful and 
flourishing in the public sector and among state-owned enterprises even after more than forty 
years economic reform. The role of work units fosters organised illicit behaviours, a process 
which is enhanced by the existence of numerous off-book accounts kept by government 
agencies (e.g., Hung, 2008). These “secret accounts” are used to finance unauthorised or 
illegitimate expenditure for the benefit of the work unit as a whole, which is in the same vein 
as Lu (2000)’s argument that corruption in China is a well-organised activity based on a 
strong degree of cohesion and cooperation amongst rent-seeking public officials.  
Corruption in Thailand exhibits similar organised features due to the historical 
influence from China, but with some variations. Khan (1998) documents that Chinese have 
been ethnically and politically well integrated into Thai society. Thai-born Chinese capitalists 
share a deep-rooted network with local public officials with Chinese ethnicity. Rock (2009) 
argues that the bureaucratic structure is well coordinated amongst politicians, senior 
bureaucrats and army officials in Thailand. In South Korea, corruption is interpreted as 
“money politics” (see Kang, 2002) during and after the growth miracle, which highlights the 
relationship between public officials and large private enterprises. Khan (1998) argues that 
the illegal money transactions between public officials and entrepreneurs in South Korea are 
not accessible to the non-capitalist class. Politicians act through bureaucrats to allocate 
privileges to capitalists that can extract more payoffs from non-capitalist classes and this 
network is well organised in the public sector to ensure the reallocation of privileges and rent 
collections. The organised structure creates strong incentives for the state to reallocate 
resources to maximise long term growth. Likewise, Kuncoro (2006) describes how corruption 
in Indonesia under the Suharto (the former president of Indonesia) regime was carefully 
organised and controlled by the first family and military leadership and was generally 
accepted by businesses because of its predictability and also the protection it gave against 
harassment from lower-level bureaucrats. A similar idea can also be seen in Vial and 
Hanoteau (2010) who argue that corruption in Indonesia was like a pyramid with Suharto on 
the top, with many layers of public officials beneath.   
In contrast, corruption exhibits disorganised feature in many South Asian and African 
countries. One typical example is India. Bureaucrats there are given great powers of 
discretion in daily practice. Bardhan (2006) argues that the bureaucrats in India are given the 
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discretion to judge “case by case”, while it then ends up as “suitcase by suitcase”. A similar 
phenomenon is also observed in Pakistan and Bangladesh (e.g., Khan, 1998). Gyimah-
Brempong (2002) argues that corruption in Africa is more disorganised and less centralised 
than in other developing countries. It seems that these countries in general are not unusual in 
that they fit into the classical story that high corruption is associated with bad economic 
performance. 
This paper aims to provide a theoretical contribution in the same vein as the industrial 
organisation theory of corruption, considering the effects of uncertainty in the presence of 
corruption on doing business. A key feature is the “treatment” of uncertainty that may arise as 
a result of corrupt behaviour. Bribe-taking in entry regulation may be viewed as a tax on 
business activity. Unlike other forms of taxation, however, the costs to individuals are often 
unpredictable for various reasons alluded to earlier. Although much has been written about 
this, there remains very little by way of a formal theoretical investigation that would lend 
rigour and precision to the arguments involved. This paper studies how the degree of 
uncertainty might be contingent on the type of corruption regime. This has been done by 
considering the case in which perpetrators of corrupt practices face a random probability of 
being caught, which depends on both their own individual actions and the joint actions of 
them all. This leads to an optimal bribe payment that may or not be random according to the 
extent to which bureaucrats coordinate their rent-seeking. The closest related works are 
Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2009) and Dzhumashev (2016). Blackburn and Forgues-
Puccio (2009) find that when bribe-taking is organised, bureaucrats take account of the fact 
that raising their bribe demands reduces the total bribe collected by reducing the number of 
firms that enter the research sector. This leads to a lower level of bribes, a higher level of 
research activity and a higher rate of growth than in the case where bureaucrats act 
independently and ignore the externality effects of their actions. Dzhumashev (2016) 
provides a further contribution by explicitly modelling income uncertainty induced by 
corruption. However, corruption-induced uncertainty is modelled by merely assuming that 
rent extraction is a random variable which follows some exogenous stochastic process. He 
finds that under collusive corruption, if reduced income uncertainty is not accompanied by 
higher bribe demands, economic growth may be promoted. Both studies rely on the 
assumption that more organised bureaucracy is likely to demand a lower bribe. If so, it is not 
surprising that more organised bureaucracy would induce a smaller negative impact on 
growth than its counterpart. In my paper, by contrast, more organised bureaucracy may or 
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may not request a tempered bribe payment given the fact that a monopolist is likely to charge 
a higher price. The novelty is that even though the organised corruption asks for a higher 
bribe, the number of individuals able to become entrepreneurs is higher compared to the 
disorganised corruption scenario, and that is the first contribution of this paper. 
My model shows that the higher the incidence of corruption is, when it is disorganised, 
the more pronounced are the effects of financial market imperfections, and that the greater 
the extent of these imperfections is, the more pronounced are the effects of corruption. This 
brings the second contribution of this paper. A further distinguishing feature is the role 
played by financial markets in providing a channel through which corruption may take effect. 
A country’s financial development plays an important role in promoting economic growth 
(e.g., Guiso et al., 2004; Levine, 1997). Corruption increases the cost of doing business (e.g., 
Aghion et al., 2008; Djankov et al., 2002) and further increases the risk of businesses 
defaulting, since corruption tends to shift resources to bad project investment, which fosters 
bad loans (e.g., Beck et al., 2006). The extra costs of doing business that corruption imposes 
can be particularly important when individuals are resource constrained and require external 
finance for their operations. Under such circumstances, the need to pay bribes may mean a 
higher amount of borrowing, while uncertainty about bribes may mean a higher risk of 
default. In either case, the functioning of financial markets is likely to be important in 
determining the effects of corruption. For example, when these markets work imperfectly 
because of informational asymmetries between borrower and lender in the financial sector 
and weak powers of contract enforcement, an increase in uncertainty for lenders about the 
repayment of loans may lead to an increase in the cost of borrowing and an increase in the 
amount of credit rationing. Berger and DeYoung (1997) argue that financial intermediaries 
compromise lending contracts as they cannot properly assess the quality of borrowers and 
their collaterals. The empirical results in Ahlin and Pang (2008) show that corruption control 
and financial development both improve economic performance and act as substitutes for 
each other. Given all of this, this paper seeks to incorporate some of these ideas into the 
analysis by considering the case in which corruption-induced uncertainty gives rise to an ex 
post informational asymmetry between lenders and borrowers, the former of whom are 
unable to directly observe the bribe payments of the latter. The moral hazard problem 
associated with this is solved through costly state verification under the terms and conditions 
of mutually agreeable loan contracts. To the best of my knowledge, no existing theoretical 
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work explicitly models the interaction between bureaucratic corruption and financial market 
fractions to affect entrepreneurial activities. 
The third contribution of this paper then follows naturally. Corruption deters 
entrepreneurship.3 Anokhin and Schulze (2009) find that better control of corruption is likely 
to increase innovation and hence enhance entrepreneurship. Dutta and Sobel (2016) argue 
that corruption prevents entrepreneurial activities through its direct effect of creating hurdles, 
in the rules and regulations of starting a business, for example, and its indirect effect of 
lowering the efficiency of public goods provision. However, the existing theoretical literature 
has done little to explain how corruption affects the survival rate of enterprises through its 
impact on risks of loan default. In particular, to my knowledge, no studies to date have 
explored this relationship from the perspective of an industrial organisation of corruption, 
namely, different types of bureaucratic corruption affecting the birth and survival rates of 
new businesses. This paper aims to fill the gap by modelling the interaction of the incidence 
of corruption, corruption-induced uncertainty and loan default rates. It further derives the 
populations of entrepreneurs under the alternative types of corruption regime. The paper 
implicitly assumes that entrepreneurial activities are growth-promoting in alignment with 
existing empirical evidence (e.g., Anokhin and Schulze, 2009; Glaeser et al., 2010 and 2015; 
Lee, 2017).4 The analysis shows that greater bribe demands have a negative influence on 
entrepreneurship. However, lower uncertainty of bribe demand is likely to offset some 
negative impact on entrepreneurial activities. A larger population of entrepreneurs leads to 
higher labour productivity and faster economic growth in developing countries, which further 
implies smaller detrimental effects caused by corruption. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a general 
environment for the model. Section 3 exhibits the outcomes that transpire under disorganised 
corruption. Section 4 does the same for the case of organised corruption. Section 5 compares 
the implications of the two corruption regimes, and a few concluding remarks are provided in 
Section 6. 
 
3  This paper discusses productive entrepreneurship in the classification of Baumol (1996). Unproductive 
entrepreneurship implies the fact that entrepreneurs are corrupt. To generate profit, the corrupt entrepreneurs are 
actively searching for opportunities for rent-seeking instead of conducting productive activities. Collins et al. 
(2016) find that corruption is negatively associated with productive entrepreneurship, whereas it is likely to be 
positively correlated with unproductive entrepreneurship. However, unproductive entrepreneurship is beyond 
the scope of this paper.  
4 Naude (2011) argues that entrepreneurship is not a binding constraint on economic development in poor 




2. The Basic Setup 
General Environment  
The model used is similar to the ones in Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Murphy et 
al. (1991). The analysis is based on an occupational choice in which private individuals 
decide on whether or not to engage in entrepreneurial activity for which various licences must 
be obtained from public officials. These licences are complementary, in line with Shleifer and 
Vishny (1993), in the sense that all of them must be procured; otherwise entrepreneurship is 
not an available option. All officials are assumed to be corrupt, and each one of them exploits 
his monopoly over the issue of a licence by demanding a bribe in exchange for it.5 
In the economy, there is a constant population of agents who are divided into two 
groups: private individuals and public officials (or bureaucrats).6 To save notation, the size of 
each group is normalised to 1. Each agent, both private and public, has the same risk-neutral 
preference and zero initial endowment of wealth. Private individuals engage in productive 
activities based on a choice of occupation, which gives access to the alternative technology 
for generating output.7 For certain types of project to be undertaken and completed, loans 
must be acquired from financial intermediaries and licences must be acquired from 
bureaucrats. There are two sources of imperfection in the economy. The first is an 
imperfection in capital markets due to problems of enforcement and moral hazard that 
influence the terms and conditions of financial contracts. The second is an imperfection in the 
public sector due to the opportunity for bureaucrats to extract bribes from private individuals.  
 
5 The assumption mainly serves the purpose of simplifying notation. In addition, the aim of this paper is to 
reveal how different corrupt practices may affect entrepreneurial activities differently and hence affect economic 
growth at the aggregate level under a bad business environment. The primary idea is to provide some 
recommendations against specific forms of misgovernance, first considering that corruption cannot be 
eliminated completely, at least in the short-run. The highest entrepreneurship and fastest growth are undoubtedly 
achieved without the present of corruption. It is possible to assume that a proportion of bureaucrats are in-
corruptible and the main results stay the same.  
6 This paper does not consider the allocation of the alternative citizenships initially. This abstraction serves to 
simplify and focus the analysis. It may be thought of as reflecting an allocation process that is either purely 
random or based on differences in individual attributes.  
7  Note that if private agents are risk averse (or risk loving), this may affect their decisions in choosing 
occupations. Cultural norms like individualism and fear of failure may also affect entrepreneurial activities. 
Thanks to one of the referees for pointing this out. The study of Pinillos and Reyes (2011) finds that 
individualism may affect entrepreneurship differently conditional on economic development. That countries 
have a higher degree of individualism may not necessarily imply higher entrepreneurial activities. Linan et al. 
(2016) further conclude that national culture and personal values jointly affect entrepreneurial activities. In 
particular, positive individualist values such as achievement, pleasure, self-direction, or an exciting and 
stimulating lifestyle, are likely to trigger entrepreneurial engagement. Morgan and Sisak (2016) argue that fear 
of failure negatively affects an individual’s decision about engaging in entrepreneurship and may produce 
various effects on the subsequent investment plan conditional on the individual’s aspiration level. In this paper, 
on the other hand, private agents are assumed to be risk neutral, and the choices between subsistence production 
and entrepreneurship purely depend on the individual’s technical capabilities, a factor which is exogenous. 
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Before any income is realised and any bribes are demanded, each individual chooses 
an occupation to maximise the expected utility, given the loan contract offered by 
intermediaries. At the same time, intermediaries set the terms and conditions of contracts 
based on their expected returns from lending. Subsequently, incomes are realised, bribe 
demands are made, and loan repayments are called in. Private individuals either repay their 
loans or declare bankruptcy. Finally, financial intermediaries investigate the faithfulness of 
bankruptcy declarations and seize the remaining assets. Figure 1 exhibits the sequence of 
events. 
 
Figure 1. Sequence of Events 
 
 
Occupational Choice  
Each individual faces a choice between two types of the production project. The first 
type involves the use of basic (or traditional) technology in some routine activities that are 
costless. This is a subsistence occupation that requires zero capital outlay and zero effort and 
yields 0s   units of output.8 The second type entails the operation of a more advanced (or 
modern) technology in a venture that is more productive but also costly. This is an 
entrepreneurial occupation that requires 0I   units of capital outlay and 0e   units of effort 
and yields A s  units of output.  
The amount of effort needed to operate the advanced technology is assumed to be 
inversely correlated to an individual’s technical capabilities (e.g., skills, knowledge and 
expertise), whereas these attributes are unimportant for subsistence production. Private 
individuals are randomly endowed with these attributes, implying a distribution of e  
accounting for individual heterogeneities. For simplicity, e  is assumed to be uniformly 






g e de e e= −  provides a measure of private individuals for whom 1 0( , )e e e . 
To engage in entrepreneurial activity, an individual must acquire a loan of size I  as 
 
8 The assumption of neither capital outlay nor effort in subsistence production can be relaxed without altering 
the results of the analysis. This assumption serves merely as a normalisation to save notation.  
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external finance for the fixed capital outlay. Loans are made by competitive financial 
intermediaries that have access to a perfectly elastic supply of funds at the exogenous world 
interest rate, r . Let 0R   be the interest rate of loans. Hence, the debt repayment of an 
entrepreneur is (1 )R I+ . Additionally, an entrepreneur must obtain licences or permits from 
bureaucrats to conduct his business. These licences or permits are complementary in the 
sense that all of them are required, though each one is issued separately by a different 
bureaucrat. For example, an entrepreneur needs to visit several government departments, such 
as taxation, public security, labour and environment, to gather all documents.  
In the absence of any rent-seeking, licences are issued free of charge. In the presence 
of rent-seeking, licences are granted only in exchange for the promise of bribe payments once 
the output of a project has been realised. The total bribe payment that is extorted from an 
entrepreneur is 0B  , which leaves A B−  units of output for the entrepreneur to dispose of in 
other ways (loan repayments and consumption). The modelling of corruption can be likened 
to the case in which public officials receive kickbacks ex post in the form of a share of a 
company’s profits. Such arrangements existing in practice implies that, for one reason or 
another, firms find it worthwhile to adhere to their ex ante bribe promises.9 One reason might 
be the threat of being closed down or having licences refused in future if bureaucrats’ 
demands are not met. Another reason might be the fact that the output from a project is 
realised in stages, with bribe payments at one stage being a condition for progressing to the 
next stage. A further possibility is that bribes are promised to avoid costly rules and 
regulations, in which case bureaucrats could retaliate against those who renege on their 
promises by threatening to report them for running a business illegally, having failed to 
comply with official procedures.10  
Kickbacks are one of the most common forms of corruption, and are sometimes 
considered as a part of country’s culture in business transactions. Khan (1998) argues that 
capitalists in India and Pakistan pay kickbacks in exchange for scarce resources and 
government subsidies. The kickbacks extracted from business are important sources of 
finance for local officials’ political survival. The “money politics” in South Korea are largely 
 
9  Note that private individuals do not know the exact type of bureaucrats in advance, though they know 
bureaucrats are corrupt given the assumption of the general environment.  
10 The enforcement of illegal agreements between private and public agents is an issue worth pursuing (e.g., 
Dzhumashev 2014; Kessler, 2000; Mauro, 2004), but it is not the one this paper explicitly addresses. This paper 
focuses on the question of how corruption might influence occupational choice and how the extent to which it 
might do so depends on how corruption is practised. One possible effect of corruption is to create uncertainty 
about the returns from entrepreneurship, as in Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2009) and Dzhumashev (2016). 
Consequently, it creates capital market imperfections due to information asymmetry between lenders and 
borrowers, which has not been explicitly modelled in the industrial organisation of corruption literature. 
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conducted throughout by large enterprises contributing to public officials’ secret funds, 
something which is known by entrepreneurs as regular “quasi-taxes” and tolerated as it is 
mutually beneficial for both parties to keep a smooth long-term relationship as discussed in 
Kang (2002). Elsewhere, it is common to see the so-called contribution frequently made 
through other means such as bringing bureaucrats to parties, clubs and luxury holidays. The 
Chinese story is no longer a secret (see Cai et al., 2011). Senior managers spend time and 
money entertaining local bureaucrats regularly in return for all sorts of favours, such as better 
government services, protection and lower tax rates. Good performance of local enterprises 
contributes to local GDP, which is one of the most important promotion criteria for public 
officials. All these expenses to cover eating, drinking, holidays and so on, are kickbacks, 
which happen gradually or by stages after realisation of enterprises’ incomes. At the same 
time, entrepreneurs have strong incentives to keep their ex ante bribe promises. In the study 
of Ufere et al. (2012), a Nigerian CEO claimed that if he promised to pay a kickback at a 
later date to a public official but decided to pull back when income was realised, people 
would get to know quickly, and he would be ostracised forever.  
The criteria governing an individual’s occupational choice are given as follows. Let y
stand for the net return from entrepreneurship. The expected utility derived from this 
occupation is ( )E y e− , while the utility derived from subsistence production is s . The 
entrepreneurship will be chosen if ( )E y e s−  . Let e  denote the value e  for which the 
condition holds with equality: 
 
 ( )e E y s= −   (1) 
This condition determines the total population of entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurship is 




g e de e= . 
Rent-seeking activity 
The behaviour of public officials is characterised as follows. Each one of them 




Tb bg e de eb= = . There is a cost ( 0c  ) to such behaviour as is discussed by many others 
(e.g., Andvig and Moene, 1990; Cerqueti and Coppier, 2011; Litina and Palivos, 2016). This 
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may be thought of as arising in a number of ways. For example, the people who engage in 
corruption may need to devote effort, time and resources to concealing their illegal 
transactions, which induces loss or disutility from having to alter their pattern of consumption. 
They may experience some moral shame and social stigma from abusing their privileges. It is 
plausible to imagine that the larger the scale of the particular offence is, the higher the costs 
are.11 This implies that the costs increase with each bribe extracted from each entrepreneur. A 
convenient formulation is 
1
[1 exp( )]c b b






exp( ) ( ) exp( )
e
Nb b b g e de eb b
 
= − = −  
Assuming that each bureaucrat faces a random probability, (0,1)p , of successfully 
avoiding prosecution for his rent-seeking behaviour, there is a probability of 1 p−  that the 
bureaucrat is caught, and his bribe income is confiscated. The randomness of p  may be 
thought of as reflecting a random intensity, effectiveness and coverage of government 
monitoring. Further, let the model assume that this probability is a decreasing function of a 
bureaucrat’s own total bribe income, 
Tb , relative to the average bribe income of all 
bureaucrats, B . This feature aims to capture the idea that a bureaucrat is more likely to 





= −  
where (0,1)  .12 x  is a positively valued random variable following a uniform distribution 
on the interval [ , ]X X − +  with probability density function 
1




=  .13 The 
 
11 In some other studies (e.g., Andvig and Moene, 1990; Dzhumashev, 2016; Mauro, 2004), it is assumed that 
the costs of corruption are low if the incidence of corruption is high. This form may fit better with “hyper-
presidentialism” political corruption than with the petty corruption discussed in this paper. In particular, anti-
corruption campaigns have swept the globe in recent years, even in countries with noisome reputations for 
corruption like China and India. For example, a massive anti-corruption campaign has been under way in China 
since 2013 under the current leadership of President Jinping Xi.  
12 (0,1)   is for mathematical modelling purposes only, which ensures that the probability of successfully 
avoiding prosecution ( p ) is a fraction.   does not have an economic meaning.  
13 x  serves the purpose of mathematical modelling only, and does not have an economic meaning. x  is always 
positive under the parameter restriction 0X −  . For reasons that will become clear shortly, I also assume that 
1X +  . 
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value of x  is realised at the time that bribes are demanded, which is unobservable to private 
individuals and intermediaries when loans are made, and occupations are chosen. X is a 
measure of uncertainty. An increase in X implies an increase in the variance of x .14 
 Let z  denote a bureaucrat’s actual net payoff from taking bribes. 
Nz b= with 









   
= − +   
   
  (2) 
The optimisation problem for each bureaucrat is to choose a value of b  that maximises (2). 
The rest of the analysis is concerned with studying the implications of rent-seeking 
under alternative behavioural assumptions. This paper considers two alternatives: 
disorganised (or non-coordinated) corruption and organised (or coordinated) corruption. The 
key difference between these is the extent to which bureaucrats take account of the 
externality effects of their own actions. These effects work through the average bribe 
payment ( B ) and the number of entrepreneurs ( e ), variables on which a bureaucrat’s 
expected payoff depends. The effect on B  is self-evident as an increase in a bureaucrat’s own 
bribe demand raises the average value of bribes. The effect on e  revealed in the subsequent 
analysis is due to the fact that an increase in individual bribe payments raises the total bribe 
payments that an entrepreneur must make, leading to fewer private individuals choosing to 
become entrepreneurs. The rest of the analysis considers each of the corruption regimes in 
turn.  
 
3. The Economy with Disorganised Corruption  
Optimal Bribe Demand 
By disorganised corruption is implied the case in which each bureaucrat acts as an 
independent monopolist, choosing a level of bribe that maximises his own expected payoff 
without consideration of the aggregate implications of bribe-taking. More precisely, each 
bureaucrat selects a b  to maximise ( )E z  in (2), taking B  and e  as given. The solution of the 
optimisation problem is stated as follows.  
 




Proposition 1 The optimal bribe under disorganised corruption is given by:  
 (1 )Db x= −   (3) 





x b x b x b
B B B  
             
− + − + + − + =             
             
  
In equilibrium, 
TB b eb= = . Substituting it into the above condition gives the expression for 
Db .∎   
The result in (3) indicates that a bureaucrat will choose a larger size of bribe for 
higher values of  , which implies a higher net payoff from rent-seeking, or for lower values 
of x , which implies a higher probability of avoiding detection.15 Since all bureaucrats end up 
by choosing the same bribe, B eb=  in equilibrium, so that the probability of detection is the 
same for each one of them, exp( )p x= − .  
The key feature of (3) is the appearance of the random variable x  which apparently 
makes the bribe random, and hence the return to entrepreneurship. In this way, corruption 
creates uncertainty for private individuals about the relative payoffs from the advanced 
occupation. For future reference, the expected bribe payment is: 










 = − = −
  
 
where the measure of uncertainty is provided by the parameter X , as previously discussed. 
An increase in X  implies an increase in the variance of x  corresponding to a mean-
preserving spread in the distribution of this variable. 
Credit Market Imperfection 
An individual’s net return from the entrepreneurship is (1 )A B R I− − + , where B  is 
the total bribe payment made to all bureaucrats. Since DB b= , this expression can be 
rewritten by using (3) as (1 ) (1 )A x R I− − − + , where (1 ) 0A X − − +   as a sufficient 
 
15 The parameter restriction 1X +   ensures that 0b   for all x .   
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condition for ensuring that x  is never so low as to imply a full appropriation of output by 
bureaucrats.  
If (1 ) (1 )A x R I− −  + , an entrepreneur is unable to make the loan repayment and 
must declare bankruptcy. Such a possibility complicates the design of financial contracts 
because of an ex post informational asymmetry between borrowers and lenders: only the 
former know how much they must pay in bribes when bribes are demanded; the latter cannot 
directly observe these payments. This creates a problem of moral hazard as an entrepreneur 
may seek to default on his loan repayment by falsely claiming that he is bankrupt due to a 
high realisation of Db . The solution to this problem involves costly verification, whereby a 
lender spends resources on investigating a borrower whenever bankruptcy is declared with 
the view to observing the borrower’s remaining income and seizing as much of this as 
possible (e.g., Gale and Hellwig, 1985; Townsend, 1979). Due to imperfect enforcement, a 
lender can seize only a fraction, (0,1)  , of this income, being unable to lay his hands on the 
remainder before the borrower “consumes” it. 16   here serves two purposes. On the one 
hand, it is in line with the literature on costly verification. A large   represents a more 
efficient verification process which indicates better enforcement and hence implies a smaller 
capital market imperfection. On the other hand,   helps to explain why entrepreneurs would 
honour their promises of delivering kickbacks after the realisation of incomes from a 
different point of view. For example, if the penalty for reneging is the closing down of his 
business, then an entrepreneur is always better off paying a bribe and retaining a fraction of 
income for himself before banks seize the remaining income even in the event of bankruptcy. 
This highlights a severe problem of poor-quality financial institutions.     
The payoff of the borrower when he declares bankruptcy is, therefore, 
(1 )[ (1 )]A x − − − . Given this, bankruptcy will be declared either truthfully or falsely if
(1 )[ (1 )] (1 ) (1 )A x A x R I  − − −  − − − +  or [ (1 )] (1 )A x R I − −  + . When holding with 
equality, this condition determines a critical value of x  denoted by x , such that loans are 
repaid if ( , ]x x X + , and are not repaid if [ , ]x X x − . That is: 
 [ (1 )] (1 )A x R I − − = +   (4) 
 
16 Note that the assumption of (0,1)   is not compulsory for the analysis. It is possible to set 1 =  without 
altering the results which will become clear soon.    
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 Correspondingly, there exists a critical size of bribe payment, (1 )
Db x= − , such that 
loans are paid back in the event of D Db b , whereas defaulting occurs if D Db b . x  is 
increasing in R , and hence Db  is decreasing in R , ceteris paribus. This implies that the 
higher the interest rate on loans, the smaller must be the amount of bribe payment if an 
entrepreneur is to be able to repay his loan and not claim bankruptcy. The probability of 










= . Hence, an individual’s net income from 
entrepreneurship is: 
 
(1 ) (1 ) ( , ]
(1 )[ (1 )] [ , ]
A x R I if x x X
y
A x if x X x
 
  
− − − +  +
= 
− − −  −
  (5) 
Accordingly, the expected income from entrepreneurial occupation is:  
 ( ) [ (1 ) (1 ) ] ( ) (1 )[ (1 )] ( )
X x
x X






= − − − + + − − −    (6) 
 Financial intermediaries make loans to private individuals in the knowledge that 
bankruptcy may be declared. If so, private individuals’ proclamations are verified, and 
intermediaries appropriate whatever income they can, less the costs of verification. The 
verification cost, ( 0)k k  , can be interpreted as a measure of the extent of capital market 
imperfections.17 It follows that if bankruptcy is declared, an intermediary’s net return from 
lending is [ (1 )]A x k − − − . Conversely, if bankruptcy is not declared, the intermediary is 
paid back in full, earning a return of (1 )R I+ . Competition between intermediaries drives 
their expected profits to zero. Since the cost of borrowing is (1 )r I+ , the break-even 
condition is: 
 (1 ) (1 ) ( ) { [ (1 )] } ( )
X x
x X






+ = + + − − −    (7) 
For any given x , (7) determines the contractual interest rate on loans, R . (7) can be rewritten 
differently by combining it with (4) to obtain: 
 (1 ) (1 ) [ (1 )] ( ) { [ (1 )] } ( )
x x
X X
R I r I A x f x dx A x k f x dx
 
   
− −
+ − + = − − − − − −    (8) 
 
17  The other measure is given by  , the enforcement parameter. However, this source of capital market 
imperfection is unimportant for the analysis as it vanishes in the general equilibrium. For this reason, this paper 
focuses on k , which does matter for the results.   
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The expression in (8) exhibits the interest rate spread between lending and 
borrowing.18 The size of spread depends on how much a lender expects to lose when a 
borrower claims bankruptcy and defaults on his loan. The first integral term on the right-
hand-side of (8) equals (1 ) ( )
x
X
R If x dx
−
+ , which measures the expected amount of non-
repayment when bankruptcy is declared. Conversely, the second integral term on the right-
hand-side of (8) gives the expected amount of income that is seized from a defaulter net of 
verification costs. Accordingly, (8) implies that the contractual interest rate R  is set as a 
simple markup over intermediaries’ cost of borrowing, where the size of markup is equal to 




(1 ) (1 )
4 2
x X x X
R I r I k
X X
  − + − + 
+ = + + +  
 
  (9) 
There is a positive relationship between R  and x  as indicated in (9). Financial 
intermediaries set a higher contractual interest rate if bankruptcy is more likely to be declared, 








 is the expected verification cost of intermediaries. It 







, and the actual cost, k , that would be 
incurred if such an event were to occur.  
The expressions in (4) and (9) define a simultaneous equations system in x  and R . 
An analysis of this system leads to the following result.   
Lemma 1 Given that (1 ) [ (1 )] (1 )r I k A r I X   + +  − −  + + , there exists a unique 
[ , ]x X X  − +  and unique R r  that solve (4) and (9). The expression for x  is:     
 
24 { [ (1 )] (1 ) }X A r I k kk
x X
   

 
− − − + − +
= + − −   (10) 
Proof. Combining (4) and (9) yields: 
 2 20 2[ ( ) ] [4 ( ) ( ) 4 (1 ) 2( ) ]x X k x X A X X r I X k       = − + − − − − − − + + −   
 
18 Results of this kind are fairly standard for the type of uncertain financial environment considered in this paper 
(e.g., Agenor and Aizenman, 1998; Aizenman and Powell, 2003). 
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= + −  , where 24 { [ (1 )] (1 ) }X A r I k k    = − − − + − + . A 
sufficient condition for ruling out complex roots is [ (1 )] (1 )A r I k  − −  + + . Given this, 




negatively. Under the further restriction [ (1 )] (1 )A r I X   − −  + + , then x X −  is 
ensured as well. Since the solution for x  is unique, so too is the solution for R . ∎   
Both x  and R  depend on X  and k . As discussed previously, X  determines the 
spread of the distribution of x , which provides a measure of uncertainty about bribe 
payments. k  is the cost of verification incurred by intermediaries, which acts as an indicator 
of capital market friction. The effects of these are established in the next result.   
 
Proposition 2 Under disorganised corruption, the greater the degree of uncertainty about 
bribe payment is and the greater the extent of capital market imperfection, the higher the 
contractual interest rate on loans is and the higher the probability of defaulting on loans.  
Proof. Given x  in (10), the contractual interest rate R  can be determined from (4), whereas 























 are increasing in X  and k .∎   
 The effects of uncertainty are due to the fact that loan repayment is a concave 
function of x . Recall that the loan repayment is [ (1 )]A x − −  if [ , ]x X x − , but (1 )R I+  if 
( , ]x x X + . The expected repayment is therefore reduced by a mean-preserving spread in 
the distribution of x . Intermediaries compensate for this by charging a higher interest rate on 
loans, which increases the likelihood that defaulting will occur. The effects of financial 
market imperfection operate similarly. An increase in k  increases the expected verification 
cost, which raises the contractual interest rate and makes default more likely.  
Population of Entrepreneurs   
 Based on the above analysis, the occupational choice is determined as follows. Recall 




( ) [ (1 )] ( ) (1 ) ( )




E y A x f x dx r I k f x dx
x X









= − − − + −
− + 
= − − − + −  
 
 
   (11) 
 From (11), an entrepreneur’s expected payoff is a decreasing function of (1 ) − , the 

















 is passed on 
to entrepreneurs through the contractual interest rate, R , which is higher for higher values of 





. Higher k  means that more resources must be spent in the 





 indicates that verification is more likely to happen. 
The likelihood of verification (i.e., the probability of defaulting) increases with an increase in 
the cost itself, and an increase in the degree of uncertainty about bribe payments. 
 Entrepreneurship is chosen by any individual for which the required level of effort, e , 
is no higher than the threshold level, e , defined in (1). The threshold gives a measure of the 
total population of entrepreneurs. Using (11), the total population of entrepreneurs under 
disorganised corruption is:  
 (1 ) (1 )
2





= − − − + − − 
 
  (12) 
Some important properties of (12) are immediately identified and summarised as follows.  
Proposition 3 Under disorganised corruption, the lower the number of private individuals 
choosing to become entrepreneurs is, the greater is the expected value of bribe payments, the 
greater is the degree of uncertainty about bribe payments and the greater is the extent of 
capital market imperfection.  
 





































. ∎   
These properties are a direct reflection of the observations made above. An individual 
expects to receive less profit from entrepreneurship if it is necessary pay more bribes, if bribe 
demands are more uncertain and if bankruptcy claims are more costly to verify. Under any of 
these circumstances, there will be fewer private individuals for whom entrepreneurship is 
chosen. A final result worth noting is the following. 
Proposition 4  Corruption exacerbates the effects of capital market imperfections, which 
exacerbate the effects of corruption.  













  − 
. ∎   
Existing empirical evidence suggests that there are meaningful interactions between 
corruption and financial development (e.g., Ahlin and Pang, 2008; Cooray and Schneider, 
2018). The result of Proposition 4 is in the same vein, that the more severe the corruption 
measured in expected bribe payments is, the worse is the marginal effect of an increase in 
financial market imperfection regarding the cost of verification, and so the higher is the 
marginal benefit from an improvement in financial development. Analogically, the worse 
financial market imperfection is, the worse the marginal effect of an increase in corruption is, 
and so the higher the marginal benefit from an improvement in governance is.  
 
4. The Economy with Organised Corruption  
Zero Uncertainty and Bankruptcy 
 Organised corruption implies the case in which bureaucrats act together as a joint 
monopoly, choosing a level of bribe that maximises their expected payoffs in 
acknowledgement of the aggregate effects of their behaviour. This eliminates the 
discretionary power of bureaucrats and hence corruption-induced uncertainty.20 These effects 
 
20  Tonoyan et al. (2010) argue that it is a common problem for entrepreneurs when overlapping corrupt 
bureaucrats exist as it is difficult to understand who to go to and if beneficial treatment is guaranteed. This 
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work through B and e  in (2), variables which bureaucrats no longer treat as given when 
solving the maximisation problem. On the contrary, bureaucrats take into account that B eb= , 
and that e  depends analogically on their bribe-taking activities. One immediate implication 
of the change in behavioural assumption about rent-seeking is exhibited below.  
Proposition 5 Under organised corruption, the uncertainty of bribe payments is eliminated.  
Proof.  Since B eb= , (2) becomes 
1 1
( ) exp[ ( )] exp( ) exp( )E z eb x b x eb b 
 
= − + = − − . It is 
straightforward that any b  maximising ( )E z  is independent of x . ∎  
By choosing bribes collectively, bureaucrats recognise that they are determining the 
average bribe income, B , which is the amount of bribe income for each one of them. They 
are therefore aware that whatever choice they make, each one of them faces the same random 
probability, exp( )p x= − , of not being caught. This is identical to the probability that 
emerged in the case of disorganised corruption, but it is now entirely exogenous to the 
bureaucrat’s decision making and does not influence the optimal size of bribe. Whatever the 
amount of this bribe turns out to be, it is utterly predictable and is known with certainty by 
private individuals and financial intermediaries at the time of making their own decisions. 
Given the above, it is possible to identify a further notable aspect of organised 
corruption, namely, eliminating any risk of bankruptcy associated with entrepreneurship. As 
before, an individual’s net return from entrepreneurship is (1 )A B R I− − + . Unlike before, 
bureaucrats take into account that B b= . Let Ob  denote the bribe that is chosen by the 
organised bureaucracy. In pursuit of its objective, the bureaucracy would never choose a Ob  
for which (1 )OA b R I−  + . Otherwise, no bribes could be extracted since there would be no 
entrepreneur. Financial intermediaries would never grant loans to individuals who are certain 
of going bankrupt. Thus, any Ob  that is chosen is the one that allows loans to be repaid.21 An 
obvious implication of this is that the interest rate on loans is driven down to the world 
interest rate, r R= , by the zero profit condition. It follows that an individual’s net return from 
entrepreneurship is: 
 
reflects the typical corruption-induced uncertainty. In an organised corruption network, this problem is 
eliminated due to coordinated rent-seeking by bureaucrats.  
21 As in the proceeding, the solution to the maximisation problem of the joint monopoly implies an optimal bribe 
that satisfies this criterion.  
25 
 
 (1 )Oy A b r I= − − +   (13) 
Compared to (11), the payoff is still decreasing in the bribe payment, but it is 
independent of any intermediation costs. These costs associated with the verification of 
bankruptcy claims in the presence of asymmetric information do not surface under organised 
corruption because the uncertainty about bribe payments and the prospect of defaulting are 
eliminated. In this way, coordinated rent-seeking prevents latent capital market imperfections.  
Optimal Bribe Demand and a Cohort of Entrepreneurs 
When disorganised corruption is present, entrepreneurship is chosen by any individual 
for which the required level of effort, e , is no higher than the threshold level, e , given in (1). 
In contrast, the threshold level of effort in the case of organised corruption using (13) is:  
 (1 )O Oe A b r I s= − − + −   (14) 
An obvious implication of (14) is similar to the one delivered from (12) and is described as 
follows.  
Proposition 6  Under organised corruption, the number of private individuals who choose to 









 in (14). ∎  
The fundamental difference between (14) and (12) is that (14) is independent of any 
hassles of uncertainty and capital market imperfection. When corruption is organised, the 
only aspect of it that influences occupational choice is the actual bribe payments that private 
individuals know they will need to pay if they decide to become entrepreneurs.  
The optimal bribe payment for an organised bureaucracy is determined as follows. 
This is the value of b  that maximises ( )E z in (2), taking into account that B eb=  and that e  
is determined by (14).  
Proposition 7  The optimal bribe under organised corruption is given by  
 
2 2[ (1 ) 2 ] [ (1 ) ] 4
2
O A r I s A r I sb
 − + − + − − + − +
=   (15) 
Proof. The first order condition of the optimisation problem yields: 
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 2 [ (1 ) 2 ] [ (1 ) ] 0b A r I s b A r I s − − + − + + − + − =   
Hence 
 (1 ) 2 .
2
A r I s
b
− + − + 
= , where 2 2[ (1 ) ] 4A r I s  = − + − + . It is straightforward 
to verify that   must enter negatively for the second order condition to be satisfied. It is 
obvious that 0Ob   under such circumstances. ∎  
As in the case of disorganised corruption, Proposition 7 shows that if the optimal 
bribe demand is more substantial, the value of  is higher, since the cost of corruption is 
lower. One may also note that (1 )OA b r I−  + , which verifies the earlier claim that the bribe 
is never so high as to drag entrepreneurs into bankruptcy.  
 
5. Evaluation of the Alternative Corruption Regimes 
 The previous analysis has revealed some significant differences between the 
organised and disorganised corruption networks. This section explores the differences further 
by comparing and contrasting the outcomes under the two scenarios. In particular, this paper 
identifies conditions for which the incidence of corruption and the level of entrepreneurial 
activity are either higher or lower under one type of corruption regime than under the other. 
The first important result is described as follows.  
Proposition 8 ( )O Db E b when 
2(1 )




− + −  , and vice versa.  
Proof. From the previous result, ( ) (1 )DE b  = − . Comparing ( )DE b  with Ob  in (15), gives 
the result. ∎  
  Proposition 8 indicates that bribe payments under organised corruption may be larger 
or smaller than the average bribe payments under disorganised corruption. Evidently, since 
the number of corrupt bureaucrats is assumed to be the same in each case, the result implies 
that the incidence of corruption measured by the total value of bribes is generally different 
between corruption regimes. 
Whether the optimal bribe is higher in one regime or the other depends on two 
competing influences. On the one hand, when corruption is disorganised, each bureaucrat is 
wary that raising his own bribe demand will increase the probability of being caught. This 
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tends to lower the bribe demand relative to the case in which bureaucrats act collusively and 
recognise at the outset that each of them faces the same risk of being detected whatever the 
size of bribe. On the other hand, when corruption is organised, bureaucrats have a different 
reason to temper their joint bribe demand, which is the mitigation of a reduction in the bribe 
base due to a fall in the number of entrepreneurs. This effect is absent when bureaucrats act 
independently and take the population of potential bribe-payers as given. These competing 
influences are reflected in the parameter condition that determines whether Ob  is greater or 
less than ( )DE b . For example, a more significant value of   makes it more likely that 
( )O Db E b  by inducing a lower value of ( )DE b  as bureaucrats moderate their non-
coordinated rent-seeking in response to a higher expected probability of being detected. 
However, a smaller value of A  makes it more likely that ( )O Db E b  by inducing a lower 
value of Ob  as bureaucrats temper their coordinated rent-seeking in response to a lower 
number of potential entrepreneurs.  
 The second result below is the principal finding of this paper.  
Proposition 9 There exists a ( )O Db E b  such that entrepreneurial activity is greater under 
organised corruption than under disorganised corruption if ( )D O OE b b b  . 
Proof. From (12) and (14), O De e  if (1 )
2





 − +  
 
. Since ( ) (1 )DE b  = − , this 
implies ( )
2
O D Ox Xb E b k b
X
− + 
 +  
 
. Evidently, ( )O Db E b . ∎ 
 Proposition 9 implies that Ob  may be greater or less than ( )DE b  depending on the 
relative strengths of the negative and positive externality effects of disorganised rent-seeking. 
If the negative externality dominates, the internalisation of externalities when rent-seeking is 
organised means that ( )O Db E b  which tends to rise Oe  relative to De . If the positive 
externality dominates, on the other hand, it tends to be the case that ( )O Db E b , which would 
lower Oe  relative to De . However, this is not the only effect of organised corruption. There is 
also the removal of uncertainty about bribe payments which eliminates the prospect of 







This has a separate tendency to raise Oe  relative to De .  
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If ( )O Db E b , organised corruption is unambiguously less damaging to 
entrepreneurship than disorganised corruption. Strikingly, Proposition 9 shows this may still 
be true even if ( )O Db E b , which is the core finding of this paper. This implies that even if 
the amount of bribes paid to an organised bureaucracy is higher than what would be paid on 
average to a disorganised bureaucracy in alignment with empirical evidence (e.g., Ades and 
Di Tella, 1999; Albornoz and Cabrales, 2013; Fisman and Gatti, 2002), organised corruption 
is still less detrimental to entrepreneurship than disorganised corruption. The reason behind 
this is that organised rent-seeking removes the disincentives to engage in entrepreneurship 
that arise when private individuals and financial intermediaries are uncertain about bribe 
payments. These disincentives are reflected in the reduction of entrepreneurial income 
associated with the cost to intermediaries of having to verify bankruptcy claims. This is a cost 
which financial intermediaries pass on through a higher interest rate on loans. The 
consequence is that fewer private individuals may choose to become entrepreneurs under 
disorganised corruption, even though the average bribe paid is lower than the bribe demanded 
under organised corruption. The quantity Ob  defines the maximum size of the latter for which 
such an outcome is real.  
The emphasis of the above results is not meant to be seen as a prescription for the 
organisation of corruption to be a policy objective. Whether organised or not, corruption is 
always bad for entrepreneurship in the model. The best policy is to eliminate corruption 
ultimately. However, the analysis in this paper shows that the effects of corruption may be 
very different under different circumstances, which may help to explain why some East Asian 
countries exhibit higher entrepreneurial activities than Latin American and African countries 
despite the equally poor quality of governance. Given the limited resources available to 
developing countries’ governments and the persistent nature of corruption, this paper urges 
developing countries to curb disorganised corruption in the short-run. This policy 
recommendation will dramatically reduce efficiency loss and resource misallocation in the 
society, and hence promote entrepreneurial activities.   
 
6. Conclusion 
In theory, corruption can take many different forms, such as bribe payment, kickback 
as a share of the firm’s profit, embezzlement of public funds, submission of fraudulent 
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information. In practice, corruption can go through various channels and different 
organisations. It can be an abuse of authority by political leaders or illegal profiteering by 
bureaucrats. It can be a coordinated strategy amongst a well-connected network of public 
officials, or a non-coordinated set of actions in a more fragmented bureaucracy. Accordingly, 
it is evident that the effects of corruption on entrepreneurship and hence growth are not the 
same. The diverse experience of countries with a similar corruption record suggests that the 
effects of corruption may be very different under different circumstances. This paper has 
sought to illustrate this. 
The focus of this paper has centred on the distinction between organised and 
disorganised corruption regimes. By the former, it means the situation in which bureaucrats 
coordinate their illegal activities to maximise the benefits to all. By the latter, it means the 
opposite scenario in which each bureaucrat acts independently to others, maximising personal 
payoff. There is a strong presumption that a more organised system of corruption is less 
damaging to entrepreneurial activities because of two essential features. First, it internalises 
externality effects that bear on bribe-demanders. Second, it reduces the corruption-induced 
uncertainty that impacts on bribe-payers. This paper highlights other important aspects which 
have not received the same degree of rigorous exposition.  
The specific context of this paper has been the role of rent-seeking in entry regulation 
and occupational choice. It has considered a familiar scenario in which public officials 
demand bribes from private agents in return for issuing licences that agents require in order to 
conduct business. However, this paper has added two extra ingredients: the potential for bribe 
demand to be random and, with this, the possibility of informational asymmetry between 
entrepreneurs (borrowers) and financial intermediaries (lenders). To my knowledge, these 
have not been explicitly integrated into the occupational choice framework with a general 
equilibrium setup, which is a new initiative.  
The analysis has shown how disorganised rent-seeking allows both corruption-
induced uncertainty and capital market imperfections to surface, while organised rent-seeking 
prevents such outcomes. The implication is that the latter type of corruption regime is most 
likely to be less harmful to entrepreneurial activity even if organised bureaucracy demands 
higher bribe payments than the average of disorganised bureaucracy. This gives some 
insights into the economics and entrepreneurship literature, and calls for empirical 
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investigation in future. Significantly, it is precisely those countries in which corruption is 
reputedly well-organised that appear to have coped better with bureaucratic malfeasance.  
Furthermore, the preceding analysis has highlighted the substitution effect, between 
curbing corruption and stimulating financial market liberalisation, influencing entrepreneurial 
activities. Financial development plays a vital role in economic growth in developing 
countries as it triggers investment and encourages entrepreneurship. Corruption may not be a 
severe constraint on entrepreneurial activities if financial markets are underdeveloped, 
whereas pervasive corruption harms entrepreneurial activities in the presence of well-
developed financial markets. The worse either one of these is, the greater is the marginal 
benefit from an improvement in the other. This provides a theoretical justification for 
empirical findings in banking and finance literature. It may also provide an indirect 
prescription to cope with corruption, by liberalising financial markets, that leaves little scope 
for corrupt practices.  
There are some potential areas for future research. Entrepreneurial activity across 
countries may also be affected by culture and subculture. Countries that put a high valuation 
on entrepreneurship are likely to encourage more people to become entrepreneurs, and vice 
versa. It may also be true that people who do not share the dominant cultural values are most 
likely to choose entrepreneurship, which is in line with the so called “dissatisfied individuals” 
in Hofstede et al. (2004). However, given the theoretical setup in this paper, I cannot identify 
personal characteristics of private agents who choose the entrepreneurial occupation. 
Individual risk preferences could also play a vital role in occupational choice in the first place. 
In this paper, each individual is assumed to be risk neutral. It would be interesting to attempt 
various types of utility functions that capture different versions of risk preferences. All of 
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